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Whilst it may feel that the ‘war on terror’ has been covered exhaustively (sometimes exhaustingly) in the literature, a comprehensive overview of the conflict from the British perspective has so far been missing. In Britain and the War on Terror, Warren Chin addresses this gap, offering a 
carefully focused account of the UK’s strategy in the conflict. Exploring Britain’s role from 2001-2010, Chin’s 
evaluation of the UK’s conduct since 9/11 is far from complementary, concluding that: “the British war on 
terror represented a classic example of how not to plan and conduct a war.” (p.214).
In reaching his damning conclusion, Chin first looks at Britain’s strategic framework (chapter 2), before 
reviewing Al Qaeda’s ideology, structure and strategy (chapter 3). In the fourth chapter the question of 
whether the overblown nature of the threat from Iraq was a result of “mendacity on a grand scale or simply 
incompetence” (p.13) is explored. The UK’s occupation of postwar Iraq is the subject of chapter 5, linking 
the failure of grand strategy to the failure of Britain’s military to satisfactorily consolidate their position on 
the ground. The war in Afghanistan is the subject of chapter 6, before turning to the home front in chapter 7, 
arguing that although the Labour government prioritized counterterrorism in the UK, an essentially flawed 
strategy saw it fail.
Given the huge scope of the conflict, Chin does well to focus his account on a number of core questions 
relating to: the political goals of the war; the extent to which there was an adequate understanding of Al 
Qaeda; how well means were balanced with ends, and costs against benefits; and whether the government 
concentrated its resources on the right centre of gravity, something Chin believes to be the ‘battle for hearts 
and minds of the people’.
Although recognising the challenges facing the UK as a junior partner in the coalition, Chin argues that 
the failures of the war were crucially informed by a failure of grand strategy. Notably, the unrealistic scope 
of the conflict (to rid the world of terrorism), the insufficient means at the disposal of those charged with 
prosecuting the war, and an overreliance on technology. A failure to fully consider the consequences of the 
UK’s role in the war, both at home and abroad, is also cited as a significant strategic failure. Describing a 
somewhat dysfunctional political decision making apparatus, comprising a small coterie of advisors to then 
Prime Minister Tony Blair, Chin suggests that the failure to properly interrogate the assumptions on which 
UK strategy was developed informed its subsequent failure. Arguing that, because of a general suspicion 
about the role of religion in politics, and a belief that Al Qaeda was an essentially irrational adversary, there 
was a failure to perceive the explicitly political goals Al Qaeda articulated.
Chin offers an important account of some of the political, structural and military issues that informed the 
problems the UK had in prosecuting the war on terror. However, in interrogating the Labour government’s 
interpretation of the threat from Al Qaeda, Chin is occasionally in danger of taking propagandistic rhetoric 
as reflecting strategic thinking. Similarly, whilst the account of the UK government’s failures is cogent and 
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clearly evidenced, one of the challenges it faces is occasionally relying too heavily on the wisdom of hindsight. 
Both the military and the government were operating with far from perfect information. Although Chin 
acknowledges this, the gap between what we know now, and the significant limitations on both intelligence 
and knowledge about many of the key actors in the conflict bears emphasising. The book pulls out some 
of the reasons why this imperfect knowledge led to what he describes as a strategic failure, and it is at the 
intersection of strategy and some of the underlying ideological and perceptual factors that informed how the 
conflict developed that some of the book’s most profound insights lie.
Britain and the War on Terror goes some way to demonstrating how what might best be described as latent 
structures informed how the war was prosecuted. Notably, the sometimes biased way religion, and in 
particular Islam, was perceived, along with an a priori commitment to a specific doctrine (in this case the 
‘doctrine of the international community’, which came to be known as ‘Blair’s doctrine’), and an almost 
willful overestimation of Iraqi state capacity. Moreover, the way the Blair government made decisions – the 
so-called ‘kitchen cabinet’ – created a situation where events were more easily interpreted in a way consonant 
with the perceptions of policymakers than their reality. In the context of the very real limits on intelligence 
and knowledge about the threat that, first Al Qaeda, and then Iraq posed, the result was both flawed policy, 
and an even more challenging operating environment for British forces in Iraq and Afghanistan than might 
otherwise have been the case. In Iraq, incomplete and sometimes inaccurate information about the situation 
on the ground hindered planning, making it more likely that broader structural biases might influence the 
prosecution of the war and the subsequent occupation. For example, the initial belief that UK experience 
of counterinsurgency equipped them better than US forces to successfully occupy areas of the country. 
Reinforced by the uneventful period UK forces spent in their initial ‘occupational zone’, when the first British 
units were dispatched to the ‘Sunni Triangle’, the realization that it was largely the context rather than the 
expertise of the British military that determined levels of violence, appears to describe a striking example of 
the fundamental attribution error. That is, the tendency to attribute internal characteristics to explain events, 
rather than external ones.
A further structural bias important in explaining the challenges facing the British campaign in Iraq was the 
frame by which the goals of the conflict were understood. Despite the wide-ranging nature of the conflict, 
the ‘war on terror’ was an explicitly military construct. It is perhaps not surprising therefore, that Chin’s 
account of the UK’s failure to understand the political, social and cultural circumstances in Iraq, was to some 
extent informed by the primarily military framework by which the conflict was interpreted. Compounded 
by the hurried timetable for the invasion, Chin describes inadequate liaison between departments, and 
failure to organise and instigate a satisfactory post-conflict plan. As Chin says: “In the run-up to the war, the 
intelligence also failed to inform any long-term analysis of the political dimension in Iraq. Instead it focused 
on generating the information needed to fight the military campaign … and searching for weapons of mass 
destruction. ” (p.129).
The book is at its best when it weaves the theory of insurgency, war and conflict with the record of the UK’s 
involvement. If there is a weakness, it is a heavy reliance on secondary literature which at times equates to a 
discussion of the received wisdom on particular issues. For example, when describing the challenges facing 
the Prevent strategy in the UK, although Chin offers a solid review of some of the issues, it provides little 
new to our understanding of how and why individuals have been influenced by the wider ‘war on terror’. 
Nevertheless, the book offers an important and rigorous account of the UK’s strategic approach to the 
conflict.
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If there is a lesson to be drawn from Britain and the War on Terror it is that, despite the fact that wars must be 
waged on the basis of incomplete information, the organisational, cultural and ideological factors that may 
influence decision making demand challenge and scrutiny. It is for this reason that Chin’s book will make 
valuable reading both for academics and students interested in the UK’s approach to the conflict, and for 
policymakers, who will see many of the pitfalls of failing to properly construct, operationalise and support 
appropriate strategy writ large on its pages.
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